In Rieger v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 2024 D.C. App. LEXIS 206 (June 6, 2024), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the Compensation Review Board (CRB) that had denied workers’ compensation benefits to a midwife injured while walking between two of her employer’s buildings. The Court found the CRB misapplied the law and failed to defer properly to the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) factual findings, which were supported by substantial evidence.
Background
Miriam Rieger, a midwife and faculty member at Howard University, was dropped off on university property near the main hospital building and an employee parking lot. She intended to retrieve a document from her office in the main building before heading to the medical-arts building for a patient appointment.
Upon realizing she already had the document, Rieger proceeded directly to the medical-arts building. Her route required her to leave university property and walk on a public sidewalk, as there was no direct connection between the two buildings. While turning onto Georgia Avenue, Rieger was struck by a jogger, causing her to fall and sustain injuries.
The ALJ awarded benefits, finding Rieger’s injury arose out of and in the course of employment. The ALJ cited Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law for the principle that injuries are almost always compensable when an employee travels between two parts of the employer’s premises.
The CRB reversed, concluding that even if D.C. adopted that principle, it only applied when travel over non-employer premises was strictly necessary. The Board reasoned that since Rieger could have been dropped off directly at her appointment location, she had made a “purely personal” choice that barred her claim under the “going and coming” rule.
Court of Appeals: CRB Erred
The Court of Appeals found the CRB’s analysis flawed. Rieger had arrived on the employer’s premises at a reasonable spot near the employee lot, with a work-related reason for being dropped there (retrieving a document). Her walk to the other building was a direct route necessitated by her job duties that day.
Under the “positional-risk” test, Rieger’s injury arose out of employment because it would not have happened “but for” her employment obligations placing her where she was injured. The “going and coming” rule did not apply since she had already arrived at work.
The court continued that her walk between buildings was also in the course of employment as it was incidental to her job, even if outside strict work hours. An injury can still be compensable if it occurs during “a reasonable and foreseeable activity that is reasonably related to or incidental to [the] employment.”
While not formally adopting the Larson principle the ALJ cited, the Court found that on these specific facts, Rieger’s injury arose out of and in the course of employment under existing D.C. law. The case highlights how courts may find workers’ compensation coverage when an employee is injured traveling between different parts of the employer’s premises.